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OF A VALID JUDGMENT
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, Professor of Law, Yale Law School,
New Haven, Connecticut
efore a court properlymay undertake an adjudi-cation, three require-ments must be met. First, the per-
sons whose interests are to be ad-
judicated must be given adequate
notice of the proceeding and an op-
portunity to be heard. Second, the
court must have territorial jurisdic-
tion of the controversy. A court's
territorial jurisdiction is limited by
the United States Constitution and
may further be limited by statute or
rule of court. Third, the court must
have authority to adjudicate the type
of controversy presented to it. This
authority is generally referred to as
subject matter jurisdiction and at
times as competence or competency.
The failure of any of these re-
quirements is a ground for objection
to the maintenance of the proceed-
ing in the court in which it has been
brought. When the objection con-
cerns the notice that was afforded
and is taken in the original action, it
must be made at the threshold of the
proceeding; a litigant who responds
on the merits or otherwise partici-
pates without properly having ob-
jected to the notice is deemed to
have waived the objection. The
same is true of an objection concern-
ing the court's territorial jurisdic-
tion. E.g., Everitt v. Everitt, 4
N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891, 171
N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958). See generally
Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;
Article 2031 B, the Texas "Long
Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the
Appearance To Challenge Jurisdic-
tion in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
Tex. L. Rev. 279 (1964). An objec-
tion to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction may also be asserted as
a preliminary matter. However, the
generally recognized rule is that
such an objection may also be raised
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at any time before final judgment or
on appeal from the judgment. Mans-
field, Coldwater & Lake Michigan
Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
If an objection to notice or to
territorial jurisdiction is raised in the
original action and is adjudicated,
the determination is thereafter con-
clusive. Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522 (1931). With qualifications, the
same principle applies to an objec-
tion concerning the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court. Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). The
principle involved sometimes is
stated to be that a court has jurisdic-
tion to determine its own jurisdic-
tion.
A more difficult problem is
whether the lack of any of these
basic requirements can be asserted
after rendition of the judgment. In
this connection it is necessary to
make two distinctions. One is be-
tween a judgment rendered after an
appearance of some kind and a
judgment that has been rendered
upon default. The other is between
the requirements of notice and of
territorial jurisdiction, on the one
hand, and the requirement of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction on the other
hand.
PPEARANCE AND DEFAULT
0 When an appearance
has been made and the
action then goes to judgment, ob-
jections to adequacy of notice or to
territorial jurisdiction may not
thereafter be taken. This results
from the legal consequences of ap-
pearance. An appearance may have
the purpose, or include the purpose,
of asserting an objection to notice or
to territorial jurisdiction. If the ap-
pearance is made in conformity with
the procedure for making such an
objection, it does not constitute a
submission to the authority of the
court. E.g., Dragor Shipping Corp.
v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d
241 (9th Cir. 1967). But it does result
in tendering the matters of notice
and territorial jurisdiction to the
court in which the action has been
brought. The court's decision of
those matters thereby becomes a
matter adjudicated and is conclusive
under the rules of res judicata.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
Furthermore, if an appearance is
made in such a way as to constitute
admission of the authority of the
court, it is called a general appear-
ance. E.g., Cuellar v. Cuellar, 406
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
Such an appearance itself termi-
nates the opportunity to raise the
questions of notice and territorial
jurisdiction. Hence, when a defen-
dant appears in an action, whatever
the form of his appearance, the
questions of notice and territorial
jurisdiction will have been resolved
before entry of judgment.
The situation is quite different
when judgment is by default for
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want of appearance. By hypothesis,
the defendant has appeared neither
to object to notice orjurisdiction nor
to defend on the merits. Yet even
after final judgment he may object to
the adequacy of notice or to territo-
rial jurisdiction.The objection may
be made when a suit is brought upon
the judgment in a court other than
that in which the judgment was
rendered. See, e.g., Conn v. Whit-
more, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871
(1959). It may also be made through
a motion or other application for
relief in the court where the judg-
ment was rendered. See, e.g.,
United States v. Karahalias, 205
F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953). Thus, only
when the judgment is by default is
there ordinarily a possibility that the
requirements of notice and territo-
rial jurisdiction will be challenged
through an attack on the judgment
after it has been rendered.
The rules governing objections to
subject matterjurisdiction in certain
respects parallel those governing
objections to adequacy of notice and
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, an ob-
jection to subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised in the original action,
either at the threshold of the litiga-
tion or later on. If the objection is
raised, the determination of the ob-
jection is generally conclusive in
subsequent litigation. Similarly, if
judgment is by default, the question
of subject matter jurisdiction ordi-
narily may be raised by subsequent
attack on the judgment, much as
objections to adequacy of notice and
territorial jurisdiction may so be
asserted. Cf. Rose v. Eliott, 70
F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The
divergence in treatment of the re-
quirement of subject matterjurisdic-
tion arises when judgment has been
rendered after an appearance but
the question was not raised during
the course of the proceedings.
It was formerly the rule that the
court's subject matter jurisdiction
could still be challenged in a sub-
sequent attack on the judgment. See
generally Note, Filling the Void:
Judicial Power and Jurisdictional
Attacks on Judgments, 87 Yale L.J.
164 (1977). The underlying proposi-
tion was that a judgment of a court
that lacks subject matter jurisdiction
is a legal nullity. The modern rule is
that such a post-judgment attack on
the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion may be made only in impelling
circumstances that justify lifting the
rule of bar.
W ALIDITY * In traditional
terminology, the three re-
quirements that must exist
before a court may properly under-
take an adjudication-notice, ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, and subject mat-
ter jurisdiction-are said to deter-
mine the validity of the judgment.
Correlatively, in the absence of any
of these requirements, the judgment
is said to be void. This terminology
implies that a proceeding with re-
spect to which one of the three
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requirements is lacking is vulnera-
ble to attack not only during its
pendency but also-because it is
void-at any time thereafter.
Up to a point, this is correct. The
questions of notice, territorial juris-
diction, and subject matter jurisdic-
tion have special procedural status
in that, unlike other defenses, they
are not ordinarily foregone by de-
fault in the original action. Thus, it is
accurate to say that a default judg-
ment rendered without adequate
notice, or by a court lacking the
required territorial connection to the
matter under adjudication, or by a
court lacking subject matter juris-
diction, is void, in that it is vulnera-
ble to attack in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. On the other hand, if the
judgment is not by default, when it
has become final it is invulnerable to
attack on the ground of inadequacy
of notice or lack of territorial juris-
diction. Ordinarily, it is also invul-
nerable to attack for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Yet even when a judgment is
subject to attack on one of these
grounds, it does not follow that it
may be disregarded for all legal
purposes. The implications of the
concept of voidness vary according
to procedural context. Thus, in con-
nection with appellate review of
determinations that are not other-
wise reviewable, the concept is
sometimes used as a basis for is-
suance of writs of mandamus and
prohibition to control abuses of au-
thority by a subordinate tribunal.
E.g., Them tron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336
(1976). In connection with judg-
ments imposing incarceration, the
concept of voidness has been used
to justify post-judgment relief
through the writ of habeas corpus.
E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963). In these and other con-
texts, the judgment may be held void
in that it may be opened for redeter-
mination of one or another of the is-
sues supporting it. But the judgment
may retain validity for the purpose
of immunizing action taken by a par-
ty or a third person in reliance on the
judgment. E.g., Nuernberger v.
State, 41 N.Y.2d 111, 359 N.E.2d
412, 390 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1976).
Hence, in a variety of situations, a
judgment may be treated as valid for
some purposes, and void for others.
Even the question whether a con-
troversy that has gone to judgment
should be opened for relitigation
may be answered one way when
interests of reliance on the judgment
have intervened and another when
they have not.
In view of the qualifying specifi-
cations that must be introduced in
order appropriately to use the terms
valid and void with reference to a
judgment, these terms have limited
utility. It may be said in general
terms that ajudgment is valid only if
it is based upon adequate notice and
is rendered by a court having territo-
rial jurisdiction and invested with
APRIL 15
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authority to adjudicate the type of
controversy involved. Neverthe-
less, it should be recognized that the
terms valid and void state a result
instead of explaining it. They are
shorthand expressions, useful if
carefully employed, for saying
whether or not a judgment is so
affected by a fundamental infirmity
that the infirmity can be raised even
after judgment.
ERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
o The term "territorial
jurisdiction" refers to the
connection between the territorial
authority of the court and the action
that has been brought before it.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569
(1977). Courts are constituted by
governments, including national
governments within the interna-
tional community and state gov-
ernments within our federal union.
The governments themselves have
an authority that is defined by refer-
ence to their legal boundaries or
territorial limits. Hence, the author-
ity of the courts constituted by them
is correspondingly defined, as least
in part, in territorial terms.
Historically, the territorial juris-
diction of courts was based upon the
presence of a person or thing within
the legal boundaries of the govern-
ment that created the court. Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
When a person was within those
boundaries, jurisdiction described
as in personam could be exercised
over him; when a thing was within
those boundaries, jurisdiction de-
scribed as in rem or quasi in rem
could be exercised to determine
interests in the thing.
Presence of the person or thing
remains of significance in the law of
territorial jurisdiction. Generally
speaking, the rule remains that en-
forcement of a judgment may be
effectuated only by executive offi-
cials such as the sheriff or marshal of
the government in which~ the en-
forcement is undertaken. Hence,
outside the territorial limits of a
court's jurisdiction, the coercive ef-
fectiveness of its judgment depends
upon the judgment being given rec-
ognition by the authorities of
another government. This recogni-
tion may be given under a principle
of comity, by virtue of legal provi-
sions such as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, or
the terms of a treaty between na-
tions concerning reciprocal recogni-
tion of judgments. This means that
for enforcement purposes outside
its territorial limits, a court's judg-
ment, even though final, is not of its
own legal authority the last word in
providing legal redress in the matter
adjudicated. Correlatively, the prac-
tical effectiveness of a judgment
against someone or something out-
side the court's territorial jurisdic-
tion depends upon cooperation of
another government.
The presence of a person or thing
remains of significance in the law of
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territorial jurisdiction for yet
another reason. Governments share
the purpose of assuring that a party
with a valid legal claim can find
some forum in which to obtain effec-
tive redress. Failure to provide legal
remedies for wholly domestic dis-
putes can lead to civic demoraliza-
tion and disturbance of the peace
through resort to self-help; the same
thing can happen concerning dis-
putes whose incidents occur in the
territory of more than one govern-
ment. Broadly speaking, it is there-
fore a concern of every government
to provide a forum for redress if no
better forum can be found, i.e., a
forum of last resort.
The point of last resort is reached
if the defendant, by ignoring or
avoiding process addressed to him
or his property, has made it neces-
sary to use actual coercion to exact
redress from him. Actual coer-
cion, in the form of arrest of his
person or seizure of his property, is
effectuated by executive officials
and not by the judiciary itself. But
such officials ordinarily are au-
thorized to employ arrest or seizure
in a civil action only under authority
of directions emanating from a court
created by the government by which
they were appointed. When redress
requires immediate use of such
coercive measures, it therefore has
to be sought in a court within whose
territorial limits is located the per-
son or thing to which the coercive
measures are to be applied.
This is an explication of Holmes'
famous dictum that "[tihe founda-
tion of jurisdiction is physical
power." McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Jurisdiction
based on power over the person or
thing is thus justified at least in the
extreme case where the moral au-
thority of the judicial process is
ignored or denied. Historically, the
extreme case was perhaps not an
unusual case. In any event, before
the development of modern trans-
portation and communications, the
presence of a person or thing within
a court's territorial jurisdiction usu-
ally coincided with the fact that
transactions involving the person or
thing also occurred there. Presence
thus signified not only the im-
mediate availability of executive
power to enforce a judgment, but
also, in the usual case, that the
transaction in suit had some connec-
tion with the place where it was
brought.
In the course of the last century,
the significance of presence of per-
son or thing as a basis of territorial
jurisdiction has diminished. Courts
are far readier than in the past to
give recognition to judgments of
sister jurisdictions without going
behind them to reexamine the
merits. Of course, since the adop-
tion of the Constitution, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has re-
quired each state to recognize the
judgment of a sister state. It seems
fair to say, however, that the Full
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Faith and Credit Clause is now not
merely accepted by the states but
appreciated by them as providing
vital legal support for the efficacy of
their own judgments in an increas-
ingly mobile society. This is evi-
denced in the attitude of state courts
toward recognition of sister state
judgments that have been held to be
outside the purview of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, notably child
custody decrees. See, e.g., Ferreira
v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d
304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
Moreover, a similar attitude is
shown toward the judgments of
other countries, where the principle
of comity appears to be becoming
infused with a comparable firmness.
Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435
(3d Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972). Still further, the proce-
dure of registry of judgments is
being more widely adopted. In this
procedure, a judgment of one juris-
diction can be transformed into a
locally enforceable judgment
through a simple summary action.
See Uniform Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments Act.
The cumulative effect of these
developments is that a judgment of
one court system now generally will
receive full recognition elsewhere
with a minimum of hesitation and
procedural complication. In the or-
dinary interstate case, the practical
efficacy of a judgment has thus
become independent of the capabil-
ity of immediately enforcing it
through local officials. Correspond-
ingly, the presence of the person or
thing against whom such enforce-
ment measures may be taken has
become of diminished significance
in the principles of territorial juris-
diction.
In this perspective, the develop-
ment of the modern law of territorial
jurisdiction may be better com-
prehended. In International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), the Supreme Court held that
presence is not necessary for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction,
stating that the significant question
was whether, in the context of our
federal system of government, the
defendant has "minimum contacts
... such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316. Under
the minimum contacts principle,
presence is not irrelevant, especially
when the forum within whose terri-
tory the defendant is present is the
only one that can provide the plain-
tiff redress. See, e.g., Perkins v.
Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952). But under the
regime of International Shoe, the
courts, while continuing to recog-
nize presence as a basis for in per-
sonam jurisdiction, have given in-
creasing weight to the relationship
between the forum and the transac-
tion in suit.
With the law of jurisdiction hav-
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ing assumed this posture, the Su-
preme Court announced its decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569
( 1977). That case held that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over intangible
property was governed by the prin-
ciple of minimum contacts and
hence the local presence of the thing
was not itself a sufficient basis of
attachment jurisdiction. This is the
first Supreme Court decision mak-
ing minimum contacts not only a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction, but
also a necessary condition.
The portent of this decision is
difficult to gauge. At the least, it
means that attachment jurisdiction,
possibly excepting cases involving
attachment of real property, may
not be exercised merely by virtue of
the local situs of the seized prop-
erty. Compare the opinions of Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens, concur-
ring in Shaffer v. Heitner. Very
likely, it means that all exercises of
jurisdiction based on presence of
property will require either that the
transaction in suit have some rela-
tion to the forum or that there be
some special justification for the
plaintiffs use of the remedy of pre-
judgment seizure of defendant's
property. Compare the line of deci-
sions following Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972). At the same
time, the logic of the decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner fairly implies that
the presence of a person, without
more, may no longer be a sufficient
basis for in personam jurisdiction.
OTICE * Under the doc-
trine of Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877), the
problem of notice in actions in per-
sonam largely solved itself. The
presence of the defendant within the
court's territorial boundaries was a
sufficient basis for exercising juris-
diction over him. Common law pro-
cedure required that the defendant
be found by a process-server con-
veying a summons, which effec-
tuated notice. However, the law of
service of process evolved to in-
clude various forms of substituted
service, such as delivery to the
defendant's agent or to a person at
the defendant's place of business or
abode. As it did, there was some
uncertainty about whether all forms
of substituted service should be re-
garded as equivalent to personal
service in their notice-giving effect.
Compare, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
272 U.S. 13 (1928) (service on
statutory "agent" of non-resident
motorist without notice to the
motorist himself held to be invalid),
with Washington ex rel. Bond &
Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Washington for Spokane
County, 289 U.S. 361 (1933) (service
on statutory "agent" of foreign cor-
poration held to be valid). But sea-
sonably it was settled that substi-
tuted service in actions in personam
was effective only ifit had a substan-
tial likelihood of conferring actual
notice. See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
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U.S. 306,314 (1950), and Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
In proceedings in rem, the ques-
tion of notice historically was more
troublesome. Hazard, A General
Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241. In principle
it had long been recognized that
reasonable notice was a fundamen-
tal element of procedural fairness.
On the other hand, the theory that a
court could not exercise authority
beyond its territorial limits created
difficulty in giving effect to this
principle. When the owner or claim-
ant of the property was within
the state's territorial jurisdiction,
notice could be directed to him and
most in rem procedures required
something of the sort. Owners
or claimants outside the territory,
however, were regarded as out-
side the range of the court's legal
reach; to require that they re-
ceive official notice would have vio-
lated the premise that a state
could not exercise legal authority
outside its boundaries. Moreover,
the authors of state legislation pre-
scribing the notice requirements
in proceedings in rem were per-
haps not fully sensitive to the
interests of non-residents. Instead,
the fiction was indulged that the
property was in the hands of a
custodian who would warn the
owner if the property were seized in
legal proceedings. Seizure of the
property was thereby treated as
giving notice to interested persons.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950), and cases following it, the
notice requirement was radically
modified. Mullane held that even
when jurisdiction was based on pres-
ence of property and the proceed-
ing was one in rem, the notice
procedure had to be "reasonably
certain to inform those affected."
339 U.S. at 315. As the law has since
developed, there remain a few un-
settled questions in the application
of this principle. For example, it has
been argued that notice need not be
given of proceedings of which the
person to be notified is almost cer-
tain to become otherwise aware,
such as property tax foreclosures
against the person responsible for
paying the tax. It is settled, how-
ever, that notice need not actually
be conveyed to the persen involved;
it is enough that the procedure
yields a high probability of giving
actual notice.
Under the modern interpretation
of the Due Process Clause, it there-
fore can be said that fair notice has
become at least as important in the
hierarchy of legal values as the
principle of territorial jurisdiction.
The requirement of territorial juris-
diction was always one that could be
waived, except perhaps in limited
classes of cases such as divorce
proceedings. No transcending pub-
lic policy required observance of
territorial jurisdictional limits when
a party saw fit not to raise an
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objection concerning them. On the
other hand, the Mullane principle
has transformed the notice require-
ment from a formality into an essen-
tial.
UBJECT MATTER JURISDIC-
TION o The term subject
matter jurisdiction refers to
the rules that invest a particular
court or other tribunal with author-
ity to decide various kinds of legal
controversies. That authority is also
sometimes referred to as compe-
tence or competency. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 92 (1971).
Whatever term is used, the con-
cept of authority to decide a particu-
lar type of legal controversy is
sometimes difficult or impossible to
distinguish from that of territorial
jurisdiction. For example, when
reference is made to a court's au-
thority to determine a matter of
status or interests in property, it can
be said that the state's connection to
the status or the property is a matter
of territorial jurisdiction or of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Indeed,
sometimes the distinction can be
intelligently made only by consider-
ation of the differences in conse-
quence that follow from the classifi-
cation. If the matter is regarded as
one of territorial jurisdiction, it is
waived by the parties if they do not
make proper threshold objection in
the original action. If the matter is
regarded as one of subject matter
jurisdiction, the parties do not in-
evitably waive it by litigating the
merits and the court may raise the
question on its own motion. The
classifications arrived at by the
courts do not appear to be wholly
consistent. Compare Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1
(1955), with Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343 (1948).
This question of classification il-
lustrates the most important res
judicata problem posed by the rules
of subject matter jurisdiction-
whether a judgment rendered with-
out objection to subject matter
jurisdiction may thereafter be chal-
lenged on the ground that the court
lacked such jurisdiction. The tradi-
tional doctrine, by no means consis-
tently applied in the cases, was that
a judgment could always be so at-
tacked. The doctrine rested on the
principle that a judgment of a court
lacking any pretense to authority is a
legal nullity. That principle is sound.
But the principle does not entail
some of the corollaries often as-
sociated with it, for example, that a
judgment is no less a nullity because
the court appeared to have subject
matter jurisdiction on the facts pre-
sented to it. The problem remains of
striking the proper balance between
the principle that the authority of a
judgment depends on the authority
of the court that rendered it and the
principle that ajudgment ought to be
final when fair opportunity to litigate
has been afforded.
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